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This article investigates minority expropriation in closely-held firms. Using
a sample of Spanish firms for the period from 1996 to 2006, we find that
firms that are more vulnerable to minority expropriation have bloc-
kholders controlling groups with aggregate equity stakes that are far
removed from 50%, which is the point that maximizes the chances of
expropriation. Moreover, performance improves when the controlling
group’s stake moves away from the region where expropriation is more
likely – the alignment effect – and, if within this region, when the number of
group members increases – the bargaining effect.
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I. Introduction
Existing corporate finance literature dealing with the
problem of ownership concentration compares a
concentrated ownership structure with a large con-
trolling shareholder with a dispersed ownership
structure.1 In this literature, ownership concentration
is seen as a mixed blessing. While a large controlling
shareholder can monitor managers and mitigate
manager–shareholder agency problems, the existence
of control benefits means that it can also expropriate
minority shareholders by diverting funds towards the
generation of private benefits.2
Some firms, however, have a single control-
ling shareholder coexisting with smaller but
significant shareholders, or even multiple large
shareholders with an individual stake insufficient to
warrant control, but which can form a control-
ling group if their aggregate equity stake exceeds
50% of the voting shares. Although such owner-
ship structures can be observed among listed
firms, they are especially prevalent in nonlisted
firms. In fact, Faccio and Lang (2002) document
the presence of at least two large shareholders in
almost half of the firms in a sample of European
firms.
*Corresponding author. E mail: joatribo@emp.uc3m.es
1 Examples of seminal papers are Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1980), Schleifer
and Vishny (1986) and Burkart et al. (1997).
2 Barclay and Holderness (1989), Barclay et al. (1993) and Zingales (1994) measure private benefits indirectly by showing that
large blocks of ownership that confer voting rights sell at a premium. Interestingly, Barclay et al. (1993) find that such
premium exists even for some blocks which are not large enough to warrant firm control. This suggests that the benefits of
control are divisible and can be shared among several large shareholders.
































Some papers address how controlling groups are
formed between large shareholders (Zwiebel, 1995;
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) and their effect on
monitoring (Pagano and Ro¨ell, 1998) and levels of
private benefits extraction (Gomes and Novaes,
2005). However, little is known about how large
shareholders interact and share their power and how
the structure of the controlling group, i.e. its stake
and number of members (blockholders), affects this
dynamics.3
This article uses detailed ownership data on
Spanish firms to examine the determinants of the
structure of controlling groups with multiple bloc-
kholders and how changes in this structure affect the
performance of firms, in particular nonlisted firms.
We find that when firm characteristics promote
minority expropriation, the composition of the con-
trolling group is designed to hinder such behaviour.
More specifically, after defining controlling group as
a group of shareholders with enough votes to control
the firm, we observe that for firms where expropri-
ation seems more likely this group owns a higher
stake in order to internalize expropriation costs.
Moreover, performance increases significantly when
the controlling group’s stake is outside the region
where expropriation is more likely, i.e. the 50–60%
interval – the alignment effect – and, if within
this region, when the number of group members
increases – the bargaining effect. Finally, the existence
of a noncontrolling (even if smaller) shareholder has
a positive effect on performance when there is a single
controlling blockholder with incentives to expropri-
ate. This is related to the idea of contestability by
which any (large enough) shareholder can contest the
influence and monitor the actions of the controlling
blockholder.
This article is related to others that look at the
effect of multiple blockholders on firm market values
(Volpin, 2002; Laeven and Levine, 2008), dividend
policy (Faccio et al., 2001) and corporate governance
(Korczak and Korczak, 2009). On the issue of
contestability, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) show
that the presence of a second large shareholder
improves the profitability of German listed firms
and Maury and Pajuste (2005) find that firm value
increases using a sample of Finnish listed firms.
Finally, Tribo and Casasola (2010) find that when
banks form controlling coalitions between themselves
there is a negative effect on firm returns. However,
this negative effect does not exist when these coali-
tions are formed with other types of blockholders, i.e.
when they form heterogeneous coalitions for which
contestability is more likely.
In contrast to previous papers, we use a long panel
database of mainly unlisted firms. By applying a
dynamic panel data estimation method, we are able
to separate the effect on performance due to changes
in the number of blockholders (bargaining effect)
from the effect due to changes in the blockholders’
stake (alignment effect).
The remainder of this article is organized as
follows. Section II states the hypotheses, Section III
describes the data, Section IV presents the empirical
analysis, and Section V concludes.
II. Hypotheses Development
On the determinants of the ownership structure
Regarding the ownership structure, Pagano and Ro¨ell
(1998) predict that in firms with a single controlling
shareholder, the ownership stake of the noncontrol-
ling shareholders should be more concentrated when
expropriation is likely to be severe so as to provide
incentives for monitoring. In the case of firms with
multiple controlling shareholders, Bennedsen and
Wolfenzon (2000) and Gomes and Novaes (2005)
predict that the controlling group should be larger
and have a larger joint stake. In this way, it
internalizes expropriating costs and minimizes the
incentives for expropriation. Thus, our first hypoth-
esis reads as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Firm characteristics that favour
minority expropriation have a positive impact on
the stake of the controlling blockholders.
On the link between ownership structure and
performance
Firms are unlikely to be at their optimal
capital structure due to wealth constraints faced
by their owners, liquidity problems or vested interests
of controlling parties (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999).
Hence, we should expect a relationship
between changes in ownership structure and
performance.
Gomes and Novaes (2005) consider a setting in
which the firm is controlled by a group of bloc-
kholders with veto power holding in aggregate the
majority of the voting rights (controlling group). For
a given ownership stake held by the controlling
group, increasing the number of group members
3We use the terms ‘blockholder(s)’ and ‘large shareholder(s)’ interchangeably.






























generates a bargaining effect as it makes coordination
on private benefit and rent extraction less likely. This
leads us to propose that:
Hypothesis 2: For a given total stake held by the
controlling group, increasing the number of control-
ling blockholders has a positive effect on
performance.
According to Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000),
the controlling group does not include all bloc-
kholders, but it results from a coalition formation
game between the different blockholders which gen-
erates different coalitions that compete to seize
control of the firm. More than one coalition can
have sufficient voting power to control the firm.
From an ex-ante point of view, the optimal coalition
is the one with the largest ownership stake because of
an alignment effect: it owns a greater portion of the
firm’s cash-flows which makes it more likely to
internalize the effects of its own actions on the firm.
This makes private benefit and rent extraction less
likely, which leads to:
Hypothesis 3: For a given number of controlling
blockholders, firm performance increases when the
stake of the controlling group increases.
Pagano and Roe¨ll (1998) consider a model with a
manager who is simultaneously a blockholder and is
monitored by other shareholders. In such setting,
there is an optimal level of monitoring that is
achieved given the stake of the second largest
shareholder. This means that some shareholders
outside the controlling group may also adopt a
monitoring role and mitigate expropriation problems.
In Bloch and Hege (2001), expropriation is lower in
firms where control is more contestable, that is in
firms in which the difference in blockholders’ stakes is
smaller or the stake in the hands of minority
shareholders is larger. Therefore, our last hypothesis
states that:
Hypothesis 4: Contestability, defined as the stake
of the largest blockholder outside the control-




We use the SABE database for the period between
1996 and 2006 from Bureau Van Dijk, which covers
Spanish nonfinancial firms. We only consider firms
that report their ownership structure and present
detailed financial statements for at least three of the
11 years that we consider. From this, we obtain an
incomplete panel with a total of 5287 different firms
and 27 221 firm-year observations for which we have
information on direct ownership and on all the
variables included in Table 1.
The sample includes three different types of firms:
1.2% are listed firms, 13.5% are closed firms and the
remaining 85.3% are open, nonlisted firms.
Ownership structure and performance
variables. Following Bennedsen and Wolfenzon
(2000), we assume that a controlling group of
blockholders determines firm decisions.4 They also
show that of all the possible coalitions with a large
enough stake to control the firm (a 50% stake), the
one that prevails ex-post has the minimum number of
blockholders necessary to gain control (hereafter the
Minimum Group) as this coalition maximizes the
group of shareholders from whom to expropriate. We
identify the Minimum Group and compute its total
stake (Minimum Stake Group) and number of mem-
bers (Members).
We characterize the ownership structure using five
dummy variables: 0–25%, 25–50%, 50–60%,
60–80% and 80–100%, which take the value of 1 if
the ownership stake of the controlling group is within
each interval and 0 otherwise.5 Controlling groups
with a 50–60% ownership stake are of particular
interest because they have full control with relatively
low cash-flow rights which makes them more likely to
extract private benefits.6
An interaction term 50–60% iM with iM
(i¼ 1, 2, 3) reflecting the number of members of the
controlling group (1M, 2M, 3M that correspond to 1,
2 and 3 or more members, respectively) allows us to
test the bargaining effect on which Hypothesis 2 is
based. In order to test the alignment effect in
Hypothesis 3, we interact the Minimum Stake Group
4A blockholder is any shareholder with an ownership stake of 1% or more. The results also hold for a 10 or 20% threshold
(Faccio and Lang, 2002).
5 Such cut offs arise naturally from the analysis conducted below (Table 4), which reveals that the stake of the controlling
group that minimizes a firm’s ROA is within the 50 60% interval. Under alternative cut off points such as 50 75% and
75 100%, the qualitative results are unchanged.
6 If pyramidal structures exist, expropriation can occur even for higher ownership stakes. And if there are dual class shares,
expropriation can also occur when the stake is lower than 50%. Under both situations, it is less likely to find a reduction in
expropriation once we move away from the 50 60% interval (Table 4). On the negative effects of dual class firms and
pyramidal structures on firm value see, for example, Smith et al. (2009).






























variable with the aforementioned dummies 1M, 2M
and 3M. Finally, we interact the variable Second,
which is the stake of the second largest shareholder,
with the dummy 50–60% 1M to test Hypothesis 4.
We use return on assets (ROA) as our measure of
firm performance.
Control variables. We hypothesize that private ben-
efits extraction is more likely when monitoring costs
are higher or there are more available internal
resources. Following Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)
and Morck et al. (1988), we use as proxies for the
monitoring costs of a firm the variables Size, Age,
Intangibility and Listed. We expect larger, younger,
firms with more intangible assets, and unlisted firms
to be more costly to monitor. Concerning the
availability of internal resources, we use Leverage,
Herfindahl index and Growth. We expect more
leverage to reduce the availability of expropriation
rents (or cash as in Ferreira and Vilela, 2004), and
higher sales concentration and growth opportunities
to increase them (Ueda, 2004).
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows some summary statistics. These
numbers indicate that the ownership structure for
the firms in our sample is highly concentrated given
that in 89.70% of the cases, a group of blockholders
has a stake greater than 50%. We can divide firms
into three groups. Type 1 firms with a single
blockholder (63.73%). Type 2 firms with several
Table 1. Definition of the variables
Controlling group
Minimum group Coalition formed by the minimum number of shareholders with an aggregate ownership stake
larger than 50%.
Ownership stake of controlling group
Minimum stake group Stake of the minimum group coalition.
Relative stake Absolute value of the difference between the minimum stake group and 50%.
A B% Dummy variable equal to 1 if the minimum stake group is in the A B% range, and 0
otherwise. (A 0, 25, 50, 60, 80; and B 25, 50, 60, 80, 100)
Number of members of the minimum group
Members Number of members of the minimum group.
CM Dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of members in the minimum group is equal to C and
0 otherwise. (C 1, 2 and 3)
Additional ownership variables
Second Stake of the second largest blockholder.
Performance variables
ROA Net income over book value of assets.
Tobinq Year end market value of equity plus book value of debt over book value of total assets.
Control variables
Size Logarithm of total assets.
Age Years since foundation.
Intangibility Intangible assets over total assets.
Listed Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, 0 otherwise.
Leverage Total book value of liabilities over total assets.
Herfindahl 2 digit industry Herfindahl index of sales concentration.
Growth 2 digit industry % change in sales year on year.
Types of firms
Type 1 firms Firms with a single blockholder.
Type 2 firms Firms with a controlling group with two or more members, none with an individual majority
stake.
Type 3 firms Firms in which the largest blockholder controls the firm, owning more than 50% of the shares,
and coexisting with (at least) a second large noncontrolling blockholder.
Small (large) firms Firms in which Size is below (above) the mean of the distribution for the corresponding sector
and year.
Closed (open) firms Firms in which outstanding shares can only (can) be sold to outsiders with (without) the
approval of the incumbent shareholders.
Firm control firms Firms in which the largest blockholder is a firm.
Family control firms Firms in which the largest blockholder is a family.
Other control firms Firms in which the largest blockholder is neither a firm nor a family.






























blockholders sharing control since their individual
stakes are lower than 50% (14.34%). Type 3 firms
with one controlling blockholder with a stake exceed-
ing 50%, which coexists with other blockholders
(21.93%).
In terms of profitability, as measured by ROA, the
lowest value (7.5%) appears when the controlling
group’s stake lies within the 50–60% interval. Note
that this is precisely the interval in which expropri-
ation is most likely to occur. Moreover, firm
profitability is greater for Type 2 (8.1%) than for
Type 3 firms (7.9%). Type 1 firms are the least
profitable according to this table (7.5%). These
results are encouraging in the sense that they suggest
that there is a positive relationship between the
number of controlling blockholders and firm
profitability.
The table also shows that firms whose controlling
group’s stake lies in the 80–100% interval are larger,
younger, tend to be nonlisted and compete in a
more concentrated sector (larger Herfindahl index)
than firms in the other stake intervals. This result
Table 2. Summary statistics
Panel A
Mean values in the following stake intervals
Mean Median SD 0 25% 25 50% 50 60% 60 80% 80 100%
Own. Distribution 5.70% 4.60% 17.16% 15.99% 56.55%
Stake 77.40% 89.90% 0.266 11.5% 36.5% 51.9% 69.4% 97.4%
Members 1.221 1 0.611 1.345 1.322 1.580*** 1.426 1.033
Second 10.50% 0 0.158 0.8% 25.1% 24.9%*** 22.5% 2.6%
Performance
ROA 0.077 0.065 0.260 0.077 0.091 0.075** 0.078 0.076
Tobinq 1.710 1.517 4.232 0.534 1.350 1.145* 1.259 2.156
Controls
Size 16.056 15.980 1.320 15.966 15.767 15.964 15.934 16.151***
Age 21.891 19 13.818 24.848 19.933 22.543 21.681 21.614**
Intangibility 0.135 0.169 0.208 0.121 0.128 0.138 0.141 0.134
Listed 0.011 0 0.047 0.02 0.02 0.010 0.001 0.001***
Leverage 0.573 0.591 0.991 0.539 0.554 0.558 0.597 0.575
Herfindahl 0.019 0.010 0.119 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.020***
Growth 0.040 0.039 0.018 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040
Panel B (Means)
Distribution of firms in each interval (min. stake group)
Obs. (%) Stake ROA 0 25% 25 50% 50 60% 60 80% 80 100%
Type of firms
Type 1 63.73% 85.5%*** 0.075** 7.31% 4.58% 3.66% 4.16% 80.29%
Type 2 14.34% 58.7% 0.081 7.25% 11.72% 29.15% 38.98% 12.90%
Type 3 21.93% 65.9% 0.079 0.00% 0.00% 48.56% 35.34% 16.10%
Small 50.84% 75.3%*** 0.078* 5.77% 4.95% 19.69% 17.45% 52.14%
Large 49.16% 79.5% 0.075 5.64% 4.25% 14.55% 14.47% 61.09%
Closed 13.56% 81.8%*** 0.070** 3.24% 3.39% 15.19% 13.64% 64.54%
Open 86.44% 76.7% 0.078 6.10% 4.79% 17.47% 16.35% 55.29%
Firm control 45.41% 79.1% 0.077 6.32% 5.48% 13.94% 12.27% 61.99%
Family control 27.76% 74.2%*** 0.082*** 4.07% 3.03% 24.28% 21.94% 46.68%
Other control 26.83% 77.7% 0.072 6.37% 4.73% 15.28% 16.10% 57.52%
Notes: Variables are as defined in Table 1. In Panel A, the counterparts are the other controlling group stake intervals than
that of reference, whether the 50 60% interval (for the variables of ownership distribution and performance) or the 80 100%
(for the control variables). Number of observations: 27 221 (5287 firms), except for Tobinq (listed firms), where the number of
observations is 325 (63 firms). In Panel B, the counterparts for the variables Stake and ROA are the other type of firms than
that of reference (i.e. Type 1 versus non Type 1, Small versus Large, Closed versus Open, Family control versus non Family
control).
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively, of the t test between one category and the corresponding
counterparts.






























is consistent with a higher expropriation risk, which




To study the determinants of ownership structure, we
estimate the following model:
Relative Stakeit
¼ 1 þ 2Relative Stakeit 1
þ 3ROAit 1 þ 4Sizeit þ 5Ageit
þ 6Intangibilityit þ 7Listedit
þ 8Leverageit þ 9Herfindahlit
þ 10Growthit þ i þ "t ð1Þ
We expect larger values of Relative Stake in firms
with higher risk of minority expropriation. This risk
increases with the potential expropriating rents
(proxied by Leverage, Herfindahl and Growth), and
the harder it is to prevent expropriation due to, for
example, high monitoring costs (proxied by Size, Age,
Intangibility and Listed). The specification also
includes the lagged value of the dependent variable,
Relative Stake, so as to allow for adjustments in the
ownership structure, lagged firm performance, ROA,
in order to tackle potential endogeneity problems as
discussed below, and industry and year dummy
variables.
To study performance, as measured by ROA, we
estimate the following model:
ROAit¼ 1þ2ROAit 1
þ3Minimum Stake Group Variablesitþ4Sizeit
þ5Ageitþ6Intangibilityitþ7Listedit
þ8Leverageitþ9Herfindhalit
þ10Growthitþ 0i þ"0t ð2Þ
Apart from the variables in model (1), we also
include variables that characterize the ownership and
controlling group structures.
While conducting the estimations, we face two
important econometric issues. The first is a potential
omitted variable problem. We tackle this problem by:
(i) including in the estimations all the observable time
variant characteristics that we think may be simulta-
neously correlated with performance and ownership
and (ii) exploiting the panel data structure of our
sample and estimate in differences in order to control
for all time invariant firm characteristics.
The second problem is reverse causality. In
specification (1), we tackle this problem by lagging
the variable of performance, ROA, by one period,
and conducting system General Method of Moments
(GMM) estimations (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In
specification (2), we repeat the GMM estimations and
instrument as follows the ownership structure dum-
mies – 0–25%, 25–50%, 50–60%, 60–80%, 80–100%.
We create a set of dummy instruments such that the
dummy instrument A–B% is equal to one when two
conditions are met: (i) the stake of the controlling
group falls within the A–B% interval and (ii) the
predicted value of the stake of the controlling group
computed using the coefficient of the variable of
performance from specification (1) falls outside the
A–B% interval. Note that these instruments are
uncorrelated with performance – the dependent
variable – given that performance does not explain
when the stake of a controlling group falls within a
given A–B% interval. However, these instruments are
correlated with the stake of the controlling group – by
condition (i). Finally, as one of the instruments in the
GMM estimation, we use the dependent variable
lagged two periods and, when possible, up to three
period lags in the explanatory variables.
Determinants of the structure of the controlling
group
The estimation of specification (1) is the first step of
the two-stage approach described in the previous
section. This estimation allows for contrasting
Hypothesis 1.
The results in column 3 of Table 3 indicate that as
firms become more difficult to monitor (larger,
younger and nonlisted firms), there is an increase in
the stake of the controlling group. We find no
significant results regarding the availability of inter-
nal resources (less leveraged and high growth firms
and firms in concentrated industries). Overall, the
results partially confirm Hypothesis 1. Firms with
different characteristics seem to adjust the composi-
tion of their controlling groups so as to prevent
minority expropriation problems. However, this
adjustment is not perfect, given the significant coef-
ficient on the lagged variable Relative Stake.
Performance effects of the structure of the control-
ling group
The second stage of the estimation design described
in the ‘Methodology’ section contrasts firm
performance.
The results from column 1 of Table 4 confirm that
there is a U-shaped relationship between the stake of






























the controlling group and performance, with the
minimum for a controlling group stake of 53.7%.7
Hence, it makes sense to think of the interval between
50–60% as the potential expropriating region.
Column 2 shows that the coefficient of the interaction
between the 50–60% stake dummy and the 1M
dummy is negative and significant.8 Moreover, the
results indicate that firms moving to a controlling
group with an ownership stake in the 50–60%
interval but with more than one coalition member
perform better than the control group of firms in the
80–100% interval. Therefore, the presence of multiple
controlling shareholders reduces expropriation risk
once we fix the stake of the controlling group.
This provides support for Hypothesis 2, and can be
interpreted as evidence of the bargaining effect.
In order to contrast Hypothesis 4, we interact the
variable 50–60% 1M with the Second variable. The
coefficient is positive, supporting Hypothesis 4.
Finally, the results from column 3 confirm
Hypothesis 3; once the number of blockholders is
fixed, the performance increases with the stake of the
controlling group.9
V. Conclusions
We perform an empirical evaluation of the role of
concentrated ownership structures with multiple
blockholders, for a sample of mainly nonlisted
Spanish firms covering the period from 1996 to
2006. We find that ownership structure is highly
concentrated with many firms having multiple
Table 3. Determinants of ownership structure
Type of estimation Cross section Fixed effect estimation System GMM estimation
Relative Stake ( 1) 0.268** (2.030)
ROA ( 1) 0.071*** ( 3.350) 0.027** ( 1.900) 0.137*** ( 2.570)
Size 0.022*** (9.670) 0.018** (1.800) 0.012** (2.010)
Age 0.001*** ( 5.970) 0.001* ( 1.710) 0.001** ( 1.890)
Intangibility 0.001 (0.030) 0.001 (0.770) 0.001 (0.500)
Listed 0.188*** ( 5.930) 0.137 ( 0.250) 0.119*** ( 2.710)
Leverage 0.001 ( 0.670) 0.001 ( 0.790) 0.001 ( 0.920)
Herfindahl 0.010 (0.024) 0.066 (0.580) 0.010 (0.030)
Growth 0.007*** ( 3.400) 0.047* ( 1.650) 0.036 ( 0.200)
Intercept 0.242*** (9.960) 0.213*** (2.390) 0.204 (0.620)
Number of observations 27 221 27 221 27 221
Fitness test 153.10 (0.000) 34.75 (0.000) 195.89 (0.000)
Hausman test 52.03 (0.000)
AR (2) test 1.53 (0.225)
Hansen overidentification test 21.12 (0.451)
Notes: The dependent variable is the Relative Stake of the controlling group. All variables are defined in Table 1. All
regressions include industry and year dummies. The F test is used as a fitness test for the cross section and the fixed effect
estimation, while the Wald test is used for the system GMM estimation. The Hausman test has the identity between the
coefficients of the random effects estimation and the fixed effects estimation as null hypothesis. The AR(2) is a test for a
second order serial correlation in the residuals which is distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
For the Hansen test, the J statistic is distributed as a chi squared under the null hypothesis of instrument validity (p values
reported in parentheses).
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively (t values in parentheses).
7 This is the result of computing Coefficient (Minimum Stake Group)/[2Coefficient (Minimum Stake Group (^2))] 0.202/
2 0.188 53.7%.
8 If a firm in the 80 100% interval (the reference interval) has an ROA of 7.7% (the sample mean from Table 2), a similar firm
with one controlling shareholder with an ownership stake in the 50 60% interval has an ROA of 6.9% (7.7 0.8%). This
corresponds to a relative drop of more than 10%.
9 In unreported results, we conduct an analysis for the sample of listed firms using Tobinq as a performance measure. We find
three main results. First, there is U shaped relationship between the stake of the controlling group and Tobinq. The minimum
performance value corresponds to a controlling group stake of 36.32%, which means that expropriation risk is maximized in
the 25 50% region. Second, the presence of a second blockholder, even if outside the controlling coalition, plays a positive
contestability role, which confirms Hypothesis 4. In addition, the presence of more than one blockholder in a controlling
coalition in the 50 60% region has a positive effect on performance, which conforms to Hypothesis 2. Third, we find evidence
of an alignment effect, regardless of the number of blockholders in the controlling coalition, which conforms to Hypothesis 3.






























blockholders with aggregate ownership stakes larger
than 50%.
Firms that face a serious threat of minority
expropriation due to higher monitoring costs (as
measured by firm size, age and listing status) tend to
have controlling group equity stakes that are far from
the 50% threshold, where expropriation is expected
to be higher. Moreover, for a given controlling
group’s stake in the 50–60% interval of maximum
expropriation risk, increases in the number of con-
trolling blockholders in the group have a positive
effect on performance. We interpret this as evidence
of bargaining for private benefits among bloc-
kholders. For a given number of controlling bloc-
kholders, increases in their aggregate stake result in
improved performance. We regard this as evidence of
an alignment effect between the interests of bloc-
kholders and those of minority shareholders, as the
stake of the controlling group increases. Finally,
having blockholders outside the controlling group
has a positive effect on performance. They can reduce
expropriation by performing a monitoring role and
boosting the contestability of the ownership
structure.
Overall, our results confirm the need to take into
account the structure of blockholders controlling
groups when studying the impact of ownership on
performance. They also indicate that minority expro-
priation in nonlisted firms is an important problem
that has not received sufficient attention from
empirical researchers, who focus mainly on listed
firms.
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Age 0.001 (0.060) 0.001* (1.730) 0.001** (2.280)
Intangibility 0.001 ( 0.980) 0.001*** ( 2.880) 0.001* ( 1.750)
Listed 0.008 (0.080) 0.004 (0.370) 0.009*** (2.990)
Leverage 0.002 (0.110) 0.002** (2.110) 0.001*** (2.280)
Herfindahl 0.038 ( 1.020) 0.060 ( 1.090) 0.142** ( 2.070)
Growth 0.214 (0.810) 0.280 (0.760) 0.202** (2.250)
Intercept 0.077 (0.219) 0.070*** (3.130) 0.071 (0.220)
Number of observations 27 221 27 221 27 221
Fitness test 95.48 (0.000) 537.95 (0.000) 739.94 (0.000)
AR (2) test 0.71 (0.476) 1.15 (0.251) 0.86 (0.391)
Hansen overidentification test 96.56 (0.905) 180.31 (0.563) 150.00 (0.812)
Notes: The dependent variable is ROA. ROA ( 1) is the variable ROA lagged by one period. Minimum Stake Group (^2) is
Minimum Stake Group squared. The remaining variables are defined in Table 1. All the regressions include industry and year
dummies. The Wald test is used as a fitness test. The AR(2) is a test for a second order serial correlation in the residuals which
is distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. For the Hansen overidentification test, the J statistic
is distributed as a chi square under the null hypothesis of instrument validity (p values reported in parentheses).
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively (t values in parentheses).
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